One year ago, a small yellow brochure prepared by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap; from January 1.01.2026 – Swedish Defence and Resilience Agency, Myndigheten för civilt försvar) circulated widely across Western media and social networks. In Case of Crisis or War opens with a striking message:

“To all residents of Sweden, We live in uncertain times. Armed conflicts are currently being waged in our corner of the world. Terrorism, cyber attacks, and disinformation campaigns are being used to undermine and influence us. To resist these threats, we must stand united. If Sweden is attacked, everyone must do their part to defend Sweden’s independence – and our democracy.” [1]

A year later, an increasing number of states release their own versions of such brochures, which raises an important analytical question: does openly speaking about conflict generate fear, or is it a measure of a deliberate effort by the state to prepare society for crisis and war?

This question is not limited to Sweden. It reflects a broader transformation in how security is understood and practiced across the Baltic Sea basin. As the regional security environment deteriorates, governments are reassessing long standing assumptions about defence. While many states have expanded and modernised their armed forces, technological advancement and military size alone no longer guarantee security. Conventional, kinetic warfare is no longer the most likely form of confrontation. Instead, contemporary threats increasingly operate below the threshold of war and target societies directly through disinformation, cyber operations, sabotage, environmental pressure, and attacks on critical infrastructure. In this context, security must be reconceptualised as a whole of society endeavour, where resilience is as important as firepower.

Among Nordic states, Sweden represents one of the most comprehensive and institutionalised examples of total defence in practice. It was the first country to adopt the concept in the 1950s, integrating military and civil efforts within a unified defence policy. [5] Seven decades later, Sweden continues to update its total defence system in response to a deteriorating security environment and the lessons learned from hybrid operations in Europe.

At the national level, civil defence responsibilities are shared between the Minister for Civil Defence, operating within the Ministry of Defence, and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). [6] The Minister is responsible for strategic direction, coordination, and funding, while MSB oversees emergency preparedness, crisis management, and societal resilience across sectors. Financing is provided through national budget allocations coordinated by the Ministry of Defence and direct funding to municipalities, which are legally required to maintain preparedness plans and crisis management capacities. County administrative boards act as intermediaries, ensuring coordination between national authorities and local governments. [7]

This institutional architecture reflects a core principle of Sweden’s approach: resilience must be built locally but coordinated nationally. Decentralisation is combined with clear legal obligations and central oversight, allowing for flexibility while preserving coherence. Importantly, this system positions citizens not as passive recipients of protection but as active participants in national defence.

Public engagement forms a central pillar of Sweden’s civil defence strategy. Nationwide initiatives such as Preparedness Week (Beredskapsveckan), organised annually by MSB in cooperation with Folk och Försvar, exemplify this all society approach. The 2025 edition, titled “You Are a Part of Sweden’s Total Defence”, focuses on educating citizens about their roles during crises through public events, discussions, and local exercises involving municipalities, voluntary organisations, schools, and private companies [8]. These activities serve not only to raise awareness but also to normalise preparedness and foster a shared sense of responsibility across society.

The reintroduction of the In Case of Crisis or War brochure reinforces this logic. Rather than inducing fear, the brochure provides practical guidance on self-reliance, continuity, and individual responsibility, signalling that preparedness is a civic duty and a deterrence asset. By strengthening household level resilience, the state reduces societal vulnerability to coercion and disruption.

Sweden’s approach also recognises the psychological dimension of defence. The Swedish Psychological Defence Agency focuses on countering disinformation while strengthening media literacy and public trust [9]. This reflects an understanding that resilience in the cognitive domain is as critical as physical preparedness, particularly in an era where influence operations seek to undermine democratic legitimacy from within.

Taken together, these measures demonstrate how Sweden embeds societal resilience within its national defence framework. Civil defence is not treated as an auxiliary function but as an integral component of deterrence, ensuring that society can withstand pressure, disruption, and uncertainty without strategic paralysis.